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Abstract
Hedge Funds are considered as one of the portfolio management sectors which shows
a fastest growing for the past decade. An optimal Hedge Fund management requires
a high precision risk evaluation and an appropriate risk metrics. The classic CAPM
theory and its Ratio Sharpe fail to capture some crucial aspects due to the strong
non-Gaussian character of Hedge Funds statistics. A possible way out to this prob-
lem while keeping CAPM simplicity is the so-called Downside Risk analysis. One
important benefit lies in distinguishing between good and bad returns, that is: re-
turns greater (or lower) than investor’s goal. We study several risk indicators using
the Gaussian case as a benchmark and apply them to the Credit Suisse/Tremont
Investable Hedge Fund Index Data.
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1 Introduction
Hedge Funds are considered as one of the portfolio management sectors which
shows a fastest growing for the past few years [1,2]. These funds have been
in existence for several decades but they do not have become popular until
the 1990’s. It is said that Hedge Funds are capable of making huge profits but
sometimes we get some news announcing that a certain Hedge Fund suffered
spectacular losses. Due to their at least apparent high and unpredictable fluc-
tuations, it is necessary to keep the risks we take when we trade with Hedge
Funds under rigorous control [3,4].
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The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is the classic method for quantify-
ing the risk of a certain portfolio [5,6]. Basically, the so-called Ratio Sharpe [6]
evaluates the quality of a certain asset by normalizing the asset growth ex-
pectation with the volatility. Thus, based on the fact that the asset growth
expectation must be high and volatility low, a good Hedge Fund holds a high
Ratio Sharpe. And the better the Hedge Fund the more attractive and advis-
able is to invest in this fund. Hedge Fund managers begin to trade with an
specific Hedge Fund only when this fund gets an annual Ratio Sharpe approx-
imately greater than one [1]. Up to this point the fund can provide benefits
after removing trading costs.
However, CAPM theory is sustained under the hypothesis that underlying
assets are Gaussian distributed where one only needs to know the mean and
the variance of returns. As it has been observed this appears to be an un-
realistic scenario in financial markets [7,8,9,10] with important implications
in risk analysis and its mean-variance framework (see for instance [11]). The
situation is much more dramatic in the Hedge Fund universe since these funds
are clearly non-Gaussian having wild fluctuations and strong asymmetries in
price changes. Indeed, these funds are characterized by their big sensitivity to
the market crashes and by trading with products such as derivatives show-
ing a pronounced skewness in their price distribution. For instance, a very
well-known CTA Hedge Fund had a poor Ratio Sharpe (0.19) but, despite
this mediocre mark, their earnings during the 2000 raised beyond the 40% [1].
Conversely, after 31 months of trading, the famous fund of LTCM had a very
appealing ratio (4.35) and nothing seemed to forecast and announce its poste-
rior debacle [1]. These two examples are not very exceptional cases, and they
make us reexamine the validity of the CAPM theory. Everything seems to
indicate that the CAPM method is not complete enough for evaluating the
risks involved in the Hedge Fund management.
Our aim here is to explore some alternatives in the context of the so-called
Downside Risk analysis [1,11,12]. We will have a look on some of the risk indi-
cators presented in the literature, provide new results related to these risk mea-
sures and finally make some empirical measurements in Credit Suisse/Tremont
Investable Hedge Fund Index Data. The paper is therefore structured as fol-
lows. Section 2 briefly describe data set used for the Downside Risk indicators.
The next section is devoted to present the backgrounds of the Downside Risk
approach. Afterwards we present the Adjusted Ratio Sharpe in Section 4,
the Sortino ratios in Section 5, and the Gain-Loss Ratio is left to Section 6.
Section 7 provides few conclusions and the equivalence between the Omega
function and the Gain-Loss Ratio is shown in Appendix A.
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2 The Hedge Fund data set
There are several third-party agencies that collect and distribute data in Hedge
Fund performance [1]. For this paper, we have used the data supplied by
the Credit Suisse/Tremont (CST) Index LLC [13]. This company is a joint
venture between Credit Suisse and Tremont Advisers Inc. The Credit Suisse
and Tremont have combined their resources to set several benchmarks for a
large collection of Hedge Fund strategies. They provide a master index and
series of sub-indices that represent the historical returns for different Hedge
Fund trading styles [1,13].
The weight of each fund in an index is given by the relative size of its assets
under management. This makes the CST Index the first asset-weighted indices
in the industry. Asset-weighting, as opposed to equal-weighting, provides a
more accurate depiction of an investment in the asset class. In addition, CST
has a web site [13] that provides an up-to-date and historical information that
allows the user to select and download data. Information available is public.
The selection of funds for the Credit Suisse/Tremont indices is done every
quarter. The process starts by considering all 2,600 US and offshore Hedge
Funds contained in the TASS database, with the exception of funds of funds
and managed accounts.
In the present case, we have analyzed the monthly data for these indices during
the period between 31st December of 1993 until the 31st January of 2006. This
period corresponds to 145 data points for each Hedge Fund style. This is not
a huge amount of data but it is enough to perform a reasonably fair and
reliable statistical estimation of the quantities we here deal with. In Fig. 1 we
show the indices that were all normalized to 100 at the beginning of 1994. We
also show the monthly logarithmic return change R∆(t) = ln(S(t + ∆)/S(t)
where S(t) is current price index and ∆ is one month. Table 1 shows us how
the mean-variance framework fails to explain the statisitcs of the majority of
Hedge Fund styles monthly returns. Kurtosis can raise to values larger than
20 and skewness is usually negative and may take values larger than 3.
3 The Downside Risk Metrics: Main definitions
For the reasons mentioned above, the so-called Downside Risk analysis has
been gaining wide acceptance in recent years [3,4,11]. One important benefit
of Downside risk lies in distinguishing between good and bad returns: Good
returns are greater than the goal, and bad returns are the ones below the
















































Fig. 1. The price and the monthly return change time series for the Credit Su-
isse/Tremont (CST) Index and subindices during the period between 31st December
of 1993 until the 31st January of 2006.
defines risk as not achieving the goal. In this way, the further below the goal,
the greater the risk. And, in the opposite side, returns over the goal does not
imply any risk. Within this approach, a portfolio’s riskiness may be perceived
differently by investors with different goals. This is perhaps more realistic than
the CAPM theory approach where all investors have the same risk perception
with the Ratio Sharpe.
In the present work, we mainly relate the target return to the mininum ac-
ceptable return for considering profitable the trading operation. And statistical
risk would be associated with the unsuccesful tentatives of obtaining a higher
return than the target return. However, the target return could also be re-
lated to the maximum loss that a Hedge Fund can afford measuring risk in a
somewhat similar way as the Value at Risk measures do [14].
We consider the price of the asset S at time t and its initial price S0 at time
t = 0. Let us thus define the Excess Downside as:
D(R, T ) = max[0, T − R] =


T −R if T > R,
0 if T ≤ R;
(1)
where R ≡ ln(S/S0) is the subsequent return change and T is the target return.
Observe that the profile of the Excess Downside is identical to the payoff of
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Table 1
Main statistical values for the whole set of Hedge Fund style indices during the
period between 31st December of 1993 until the 31st January of 2006. We show the
first moment, the standard deviation, the kurtosis and the skewness for the monthly
returns. Most of the indices have a kurtosis larger than one and some of them also
have a non negligible skewness. The mean-variance framework might fit well only
for very few of them (the Managed Futures and the Equity Market Neutral styles).
Hedge Funds indices average std dev kurtosis skewness
Credit Suisse/Tremont Index 0.008688 0.02255 2.335 -0.03966
Convertible Arbitrage 0.007074 0.01383 3.180 -1.367
Dedicated Short Bias -0.001919 0.04913 1.239 0.6276
Emerging Markets 0.007086 0.04817 6.519 -1.142
Equity Market Neutral 0.007977 0.008410 0.3435 0.2986
Event Driven 0.009229 0.01680 27.82 -3.773
Fixed Income Arbitrage 0.005173 0.01097 17.81 -3.243
Global Macro 0.01080 0.03179 3.033 -0.2113
Long/Short 0.009653 0.02942 3.998 -0.04185
Managed Futures 0.005327 0.03456 0.4723 -0.09699
Event Driven Distressed 0.01068 0.01896 22.24 -3.255
Event Driven Multistrategy 0.008430 0.01795 19.28 -2.855
Event Driven Risk Arbitrage 0.006306 0.01217 7.221 -1.395
the European put option [14]. We can study the first and second moments of
the Excess Downside D(T ). Therefore, the first moment is defined as




while second moment reads
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Fig. 2. The quotient between the Excess Downside Deviation and the Standard
Deviation for the Credit Suisse/Tremont (CST) Index and subindices during the
period between 31st December of 1993 until the 31st January of 2006. We show the
quotient given by Eq. (7) in terms of lambda given by Eq. (6) for several Hedge
Fund styles when target return is between T = −30% and T = 30% annual rates.
The inset provides the same numbers but in a logarithmic scale.
4 The Adjusted Ratio Sharpe
First possible extension wants to keep the CAPM approach but with a rough
correction based on the empirical EDD. This is probably a simplest sophisti-
cation to the mean-variance framework. Its interest is based on the fact that
correction wants to replace volatility σ by d(T ). The CAPM measures risk of





where r is the risk-free interest rate ratio, µ = E [R] is the first moment of
the return, and σ2 = Var[R] is the return variance.
Johnson etal. [15] propose an Adjusted Ratio Sharpe as “the Ratio Sharpe
that would be implied by the fund’s observed Downside Deviation if returns












and define the modified Ratio Sharpe with the quotient
λ ≡ µ− T
σ
. (6)
This variable is very important not only in this rough correction of the Ratio
Sharpe but also in the analysis of the future risk indicators we will show herein.
These measures can be all represented in terms of lambda if underlying is
Gaussian.







N(−λ)− λN ′(λ). (7)













while its derivative is denoted by a prime and reads exp (−λ2/2) /
√
2pi. Fig-
ure 2 plots the quotient in terms of the modified lambda for a broad range of
target returns T , from -30% until 30% annualized rates.
We can finally numerically invert the ratio d(T )/σ obtained from Eq. (7). We
will thus obtain the so-called Adjusted Ratio Sharpe. That is: the lambda that
corresponds to the Excess Downside Deviation ratio in the event of returns are
Gaussian and accomplishing the equality (7). We show the resulting empirical
results in Table 2 for the special case when T = 5%. The Adjusted Ratio
Sharpe might differ significantly from the Ratio Sharpe.
5 The Sortino and Upside Potential ratios
More dramatic modifications of the Ratio Sharpe are the ones that Sortino
etal. propose in their works [16,17,18,19]. In contrast with the adjusted Ratio
Sharpe, this pair of indicators would be self-consistent measures that do not
need to assume that the underlying asset is Gaussian. All averages involved
in these indicators are directly computed from the historical data. However,
these two new ratios look like the Ratio Sharpe. In both cases, the risk-free




The monthly Adjusted Ratio Sharpe for several Hedge Fund indices. We first derive
the monthly Excess Downside Deviation ratio d(T )/σ for several Hedge Fund indices
when annual return growth is T = 5%. Once we get these quantities we numerically
invert Eq. (7). We thus compare these results with the Ratio Sharpe.
Hedge Funds d(T )/σ Adj. Ratio Sharpe Ratio Sharpe
Credit Suisse/Tremont Index 0.609 0.63 0.188
Convertible Arbitrage 0.729 -0.13 0.289
Dedicated Short Bias 0.735 -0.16 -0.0704
Emerging Markets 0.746 -0.23 -0.00229
Equity Market Neutral 0.447 1.82 0.549
Event Driven 0.756 -0.29 0.249
Fixed Income Arbitrage 0.845 -0.80 0.115
Global Macro 0.626 0.51 0.216
Long/Short 0.612 0.61 0.171
Managed Futures 0.688 0.12 0.0284
Event Driven Distressed 0.725 -0.11 0.287
Event Driven Multistrategy 0.740 -0.20 0.194
Event Driven Risk Arbitrage 0.705 0.01 0.211





where d(T ) is given by Eq. (3). There is a sophistication made by the same
Sortino that only wants to give reason of the excess return. This new measure
is interested in the return average up to the target return. Thus, the upside







































Fig. 3. The monthly Sortino Ratio for the Credit Suisse/Tremont (CST) Index and
subindices during the period between 31st December of 1993 until the 31st January
of 2006. We show the monthly SoR(T ) given by Eq. (9) in terms of lambda given
by Eq. (6) for several Hedge Fund styles when target return is between T = −30%
and T = 30% annual rates. We compare them with the Gaussian Sortino Ratio (12)
and observe that the historical data results are not very far from the Gaussian
hypothesis.
or equivalently µ+(T ) = µ − T + µ−(T ) (cf. Eq.(2)). One therefore can also
write UPR(T ) = SoR(T ) + µ−(T )/d(T ).
Both measures behave as the Ratio Sharpe. The greater ratio corresponds to
the better asset. Let us calculate the quotients given Eqs. (9) and (10) in case
that returns were Gaussian. We thus first need the Gaussian d(T ) which is
already given by Eq. (7). In such a case the Sortino Ratio reads
SoR(T ) =
λ
[(λ2 + 1)N(−λ)− λN ′(λ)]1/2
, (12)
while, also taking into account that under the Gaussian hypothesis the upside
average (11) is
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Fig. 4. The monthly Upside Potential Ratio for the Credit Suisse/Tremont (CST)
Index and subindices during the period between 31st December of 1993 until the 31st
January of 2006. We show the UPR(T ) given by Eq. (9) in terms of lambda given by
Eq. (6) for several Hedge Fund styles and when target return is between T = −30%
and T = 30% annual rates. We compare them with the Gaussian UPR (14). The
inset shows the same plot but with a logarithmic scale in the UPR axe.
the Upside Potential Ratio reads
UPR(T ) =
λN (λ) +N ′(λ)
[(λ2 + 1)N(−λ)− λN ′(λ)]1/2
. (14)






Some special and limiting cases are
−1 < SoR(T ) <∞ and 0 < UPR(T ) <∞,
where upper and lower bounds respectively correspond to the limiting cases
T →∞ and T → −∞.
These measures could be annualized as it was done with the Ratio Sharpe.
Recall that the monthly Ratio Sharpe is annualized when we multiply the ratio
by the factor
√
12. However, in principle, this is not as easy in the present case
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Fig. 5. The monthly Gain-Loss Ratio for the Credit Suisse/Tremont (CST) Index
and subindices during the period between 31st December of 1993 until the 31st Jan-
uary of 2006. We show the G-L ratio given by Eq. (15) in terms of lambda given by
Eq. (6) for several Hedge Fund styles and when target return is between T = −30%
and T = 30% annual rates. We compare them with the Gaussian UPR (20). The
inset shows the same plot but with a logarithmic scale in the Gain-Loss Ratio axe.
We represent the Sortino and Upside Potential ratios in Figs. 3 and 4. We
there plot the Gaussian case as a benchmark and in terms of lambda. The
empirical data is also shown in terms of lambda to get the results comparable.
For the empirical data we have computed the risk measures for a broad range
of target returns T , from -30% until 30% annualized rates. In general, we
do not perceive much differences between the two plots. In both, the more
Gaussian case and in a larger domain in terms of lambda corresponds to the
Equity Market Neutral strategy. The rest of trading styles could be packed
in several groups in the two risk measures. Particularly, for large λ (negative
T ) we can easily see that risk in most of the Event Driven indices and the
Fixed Income Arbitrage index coincides. The reason why Gaussian curve is
beyond most of the indices risk measures should be found in the negative and
nonnegligible skewness of these indices.
6 The Gain-Loss Ratio
Bernardo and Ledoit [20] propose another risk measure called Gain-Loss Ratio
(G-L). This is probably the most well-grounded measure of the existing alter-
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natives to CAPM theory. This measure is an alternative approach to “asset
pricing in incomplete markets that bridges the gap between the two fundamen-
tal approaches in finance: model-based pricing and pricing by no arbitrage”.
In contrast with the Sortino ratios, G-L have no comparable magnitudes with
the Ratio Sharpe.
In the simplest case, the attractiveness of an investment opportunity is mea-





which is the quotient between the averages of positive and negative parts of
the payoff after removing the trading costs included in the target return T .
This ratio is the basis to an alternative asset pricing framework by limiting the
maximum Gain-Loss ratio. We can therefore restrict the admissible set of pric-
ing kernels and also constrain the set of prices that can be assigned to assets.
In other words, we admitt that there are arbitrage opportunities but limited
in a certain range of prices. In the same way, Bernardo and Ledoit [20] state
that the theoretical no arbitrage assumption is related to the mathematical
demmand that the Gain-Loss Ratio is 1.
Following the notation used above we have that







(T − R)p(R)dR, (16)
and







(R− T )p(R)dR. (17)
Note that from these definitions we can obtain the following expression
µ+(T )− µ−(T ) = µ− T = λσ. (18)
where we also take into account the definition of λ given by Eq. (6).
In case we assume that returns are Gaussian, we have already obtained the
µ+(T ) average. From Eqs. (13) and (18), we thus have
µ−(T )
σ





= λN(λ) +N ′(λ).






N ′(λ)− λN(−λ) . (20)
Note that no arbitrage corresponds to λ = 0 which means that average µ equals
the target return T . Also observe that the Gain-Loss has not time units. This
means that annual Gain-Loss ratio should have the same value as the monthly
Gain-Loss ratio. This is a very interesting and poweful property that avoids
any discussion about the way we derive the annualized risk indicator as it
happens with the Sortino ratios and the Adjusted Ratio Sharpe.
The bounds of the Gain-Loss Ratio are
0 ≤ G-L(T ) ≤ ∞. (21)
which respectively correspond to T →∞ and T → −∞. One can also see that
G-L ratio at least in Gaussian framework is a non decreasing function whose
fastest growing is for positive lambdas, that is T < µ. Thus, risk measure is
very sensitive to small changes when λ is positive while for negative lambda
G-L ratio does not provide a lot of information.
Figure 5 confirms this very last statement. The same plot also depicts the
empirical results for a broad range of target of annualized returns between
-30% and +30%. The more Gaussian behaviour and in a broader domain of
lambda again corresponds to Equity Market Neutral strategy although other
styles such as the Managed Futures also follows nicely the curve. In contrast
with the SoR and UPR risk measures, it is much more difficult to detect groups
with very similar behaviour.
Finally one should mention that the so-called Omega function [21,22] provides
exactly the same measure as the Gain-Loss ratio. This is shown in Appendix A.
7 Final remarks
Hedge Funds have enjoyed increasing levels of popularity coupled with opacity
and some myths [1,2]. We here have followed this recent interest in studying
the Hedge Funds even from an academic purpose (see for instance Refs. [23,24]
published in this journal). This is possible since some data such as the Credit
Suisse/Tremont Investable Hedge Fund Index is now easily available. The
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current investigation wants to go one step further on the Downside risk met-
rics applied to the empirics of the Hedge Fund style indices. The strong non
Gaussian character of financial markets have led to consider risk measures
alternatives to CAPM theory in the context of the Downside Risk [1,3,4,11].
The measures are able to distinguish between good and bad returns com-
pared to our own personal target T in a very simple manner. In particular,
we have focussed on the Adjusted Ratio Sharpe, the Sortino ratios and the
Gain-Loss ratio from both a theoretical and empirical point of view. We have
seen that the Downside Risk framework provides quite robust measurements
and it appears to be the most natural extension to the CAPM theory and its
mean-variance framework.
The Hedge Funds is a field where these risk measures have most promising
future. There are mainly two reasons. First reason is the existence of wild
fluctuations and pronounced negative skewness in data. And secondly is that
there are few empirical data points available (of the order of hundred points).
This last reason makes impossible to work with other more sophisticated risk
metrics which are more sensitive to the wildest fluctuations. However, we have
also seen that the Gaussian results for the studied Downside risk measures are
still important. We have shown that they work very well as a benchmark if
we represent the empirical risk measures in terms of a modified Ratio Sharpe
λ = (µ− T )/σ. Perhaps quite suprisingly, we can also see in Figs. 3, 4, and 5
that the Gaussian trading investment behaviour works better than most of
the sophisticated trading style indices. Main reason lies on the fact that the
Hedge Fund provide high benefits with the cost of having in most cases a
negative skewness. Downside risk measures take into account this asymetry
and includes it to the risk perception of each investor. This is therefore an-
other argument for using the Downside framework since Ratio Sharpe might
wrongly overvaluate the quality of a Hedge Fund by ignoring the skewness
(and kurtosis) effects in risk analysis.
There are many other interesting things to study under the current perspec-
tive. First possibility is to deeper study these risk indicators when returns
obey another return distribution much more realistic like a Laplace distribu-
tion [25,26] or even a power law distribution. We could also compute the here
presented risk measures when target return is another asset. Finally, another
possibility is to go further and study the effect of these analysis in the multi-




The author acknowledges support from Direccio´n General de Investigacio´n
under contract FIS2006-05204.
A The Omega function
There exists another risk measure which is a different way of evaluating the
Gain-loss ratio. This is perhaps more efficient since data analysis using this
formalism is more reliable. The so-called Omega function is equivalent to
the Gain-Loss Ratio although their authors do not tell anything about this














taking into account that F (R) is the cumulative distribution of the probability
















Due to the fact that function F comes from a probability distribution, by
definition it is necessary that
lim
R→−∞
RF (R) = 0.
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and finally see (cf. Eq. (16)) that




= µ−(T ). (A.2)
Secondly, we can do the same with I2. Thus, similar calculations lead us to




(1− F (R))dR = µ+(T ). (A.3)
Therefore, according to the values derived for I1 and I2 and definition 15, we




= G-L(T ). (A.4)
Obviously, Omega will have the same bounds and behavior as the Gain-Loss
Ratio and previous results can be also applied to the Omega function.










This variable wants to measure the sensitivity of the Omega function with











But, from Eqs. (A.2)–(A.3) and taking into account that [32]
∂I2
∂T
= F (T )− 1 ∂I1
∂T
= F (T ),
we finally obtain



























since µ− is given by Eq. (19), µ+ is given by Eq. (13),
∂µ−
∂λ
= −σN(−λ) and ∂µ+
∂λ
= σN(λ).
The Omega risk is always negative since the function Ω is a non-decreasing
function.
Finally, we should mention that linear transformations such as
T → φ(T ) = AT +B




Ωˆ [φ(T )] = Ω(T ) if A > 0;
Ωˆ [φ(T )] = 1/Ω(T ) if A < 0.
This is also true for the Gain-Loss Ratio equivalent risk indicator.
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